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POLICE COERCION OF WITNESSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal procedure underwent a "revolution" in the 1960's marked
by a series of Supreme Court decisions in which several constitutional
guarantees were applied to criminal proceedings.1 An important policy
objective of this expanded application of constitutional guarantees to
criminal procedures is to deter the police from engaging in illegal meth-
ods of law enforcement. 2  As a result of this "revolution," as well as
earlier developments, a defendant cannot now be convicted, for example,
on the basis of his coerced confession, 3 or on information which he
divulges to the police if he has not been advised of his right to remain
silent and his right to counsel.4 A related question remains, however:
Can a defendant be convicted on information which is either physically
or psychologically coerced from a witness in violation of the witness'
rights?
A vivid example of police coercion of a reluctant non-defendant wit-
1. Specific Bill of Rights guarantees were extended to state criminal proceedings
in: Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right of indigent to assistance of
counsel in prosecution for petty offense); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)
(ban against double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to
jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy
trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront opposing witnesses);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v.
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right of indigent to assistance of counsel in felony
trial); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (search and seizure). The expansion of
criminal defendants' rights is also evident in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967),
and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (evidence of lineup inadmissible if
obtained in violation of defendant's sixth amendment rights to counsel and confronta-
tion), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confessions and admissions ob-
tained when defendant had not been informed of right to remain silent and right to
counsel inadmissible).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961). In addition to attempting to curb illegal police practices a major policy under-
lying the cases comprising the criminal law "revolution" was to exclude unreliable
evidence. See note 17 infra and accompanying text.
3. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). This would include the more ex-
treme situation in which a defendant is actually deprived of counsel. See Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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ness was recently presented in People v. Portelli.5 The defendant,
Portelli, had been indicted for the murder of two policemen. At trial the
government called as its chief witness Richard Melville, to whose home
the defendant had allegedly fled following the crime. Melville testi-
fied that three detectives had taken him into custody for questioning,
held him in custody for one day without arresting him, and tortured him
into giving a statement similar to his later trial testimony." Had Mel-
ville been the subject of a criminal prosecution, he clearly would have
had standing to exclude his involuntary out-of-court statement from
his trial.7  But when Portelli, the defendant, attempted to exclude Mel-
ville's testimony, the trial court held that because the fifth amendment
rights of Melville and not Portelli had been violated, Portelli could not
have the testimony excluded from his trial.8 The police, by tortur-
ing Melville, were thus able to obtain evidence crucial to Portelli's prose-
cution and to circumvent the deterrence policies of the aforementioned
criminal law revolution by engaging in clearly illegal and unconscion-
5. 15 N.Y.2d 235, 205 N.E.2d 857, 257 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1009 (1966).
6. Melville's "interrogation" was allegedly conducted by eight or nine detectives
who twisted his arm, beat him with a stick, struck him with open hands, stripped him
naked, hit him in the testicles, and touched lighted cigarettes to his back. Brief for
Petitioner-Appellant at 11, 12, United States ex rel. Portelli v. LaVallee, 469 F.2d 1239
(2d Cir. 1972). Both the trial court and the district attorney strongly condemned
the police tactics used, and the judge charged the jury in part:
I was nauseated, and ... these cops, who gave this man a beating in that
station house, they deserve the most utter condemnation on the part of every
citizen in this community. This isn't Russia; this isn't Hitler's Germany;
this isn't Castro's Cuba. This is America. This is a glorious country where
we don't tolerate things of that sort ....
Id. at 11.
7. There is no question that the confessor has standing when a coerced confession
is sought to be used against the confessor himself. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); see note 3 supra.
8. Both Portelli and a co-defendant were convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death; the sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment.
The district court denied Portelli's subsequent petition for habeas corpus. United
States ex rel. Portelli v. LaVallee, Civil No. 72-CV-299 (N.D.N.Y., June 20, 1972).
Portelli, however, was granted a certificate of probable cause and leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court,
469 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1972), basing its opinion largely on 3 J. WiOMoRn, EVIENCE
§ 815, at 289-90 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970):
For duress of a witness, not being a party, the same considerations would
prescribe that there would be no exclusion on the ground of extrajudicial
threats or other forms of coercion ...
469 F.2d at'1240. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 411 U.S. 950 (1973).
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able practices.9
This Note will examine the conventional approach to the issue of
a defendant's ability to assert the constitutional rights of a "coerced"
third party, the hitherto unsuccessful arguments for a change in that
approach, and the contentions urged unsuccessfully by defense counsel
in Portelli.
]-. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS: STANDING AND THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
An understanding of the problems raised by a coerced witness'
testimony requires a knowledge of the concepts of standing and the
exclusionary rule. Standing, or an adversary interest in the outcome
of a controversy, is required for all constitutional challenges. 10 Although
a criminal defendant clearly has a sufficient personal stake in the out-
come of his own trial, he does not automatically have standing to raise
all constitutional issues bearing on his trial but may properly contest
only those issues which concern his constitutional rights or, in certain
limited circumstances, the rights of third parties."
The exclusionary rule bars the admission at trial of evidence obtained
9. The Portelli case is not an isolated instance of such conduct. In People v.
Bradford, 10 Mich. App. 696, 160 N.W.2d 373 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1022
(1969), a similar fact pattern was present. Two policemen had been seriously
wounded while investigating a robbery. One suspect was arrested and, after being
coerced by the police, implicated the defendant in a confession. The suspect later was
the chief witness at the defendant's trial, where he repeated his confession and gave
details of the earlier coercion. The appellate court held that the trial court had been
correct in not excluding the testimony as untrustworthy since the question of trust-
worthiness was for the jury. But cf. note 66 infra.
10. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939).
11. Tileston v. Uliman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). The Supreme Court has allowed
some parties to assert the constitutional rights of others in certain limited circumstances.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (professional relationship of appel-
lants to patients allowed them to raise rights of patients); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (NAACP permitted to assert rights of members
in refusing to disclose membership lists); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953)
(party permitted to contest restrictive covenant even though not a member of restricted
race); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (party permitted to raise
property rights of parents in action on statute requiring parents to send children to
public schools). The generalization emerges from these cases that where the constitu-
tional rights of a group of persons cannot be effectively presented except through rep-
resentatives, owing to the size of the group, a representative may assert the rights of
all members of the group provided the representative's rights have also been infringed.
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in violation of the Constitution. 12  Since the fifth amendment specifi-
cally prohibits the use of "compelled" testimony in a criminal case,
the exclusionary rule found ready application to violations of that
amendment."3 The Supreme Court later extended the rule to cover
violations of the fourth amendment,' 4 and the exclusionary rule is now
recognized as the proper vehicle to raise all constitutional challenges
to the admissibility of evidence obtained by unconstitutional police
practices. 15
12. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657
(1961); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
13. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Weeks doctrine was not at
once considered to be a constitutional requirement. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), the Court ruled that, although the fourth amendment was applicable to the
states under the fourteenth amendment, state courts need not exclude all evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fourth amendment. A concurring opinion by Justice
Black maintained that the exclusionary rule as applied in federal cases was merely a
judicially created rule of evidence adopted under the Court's supervisory powers over
the federal court system. The Supreme Court later applied the exclusionary rule to the
states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court rejected the "factual" grounds
on which Wolf was based and noted that other remedies, such as tort suits against
offending officers, had proved to be ineffective deterrents. The Court considered the
exclusionary rule as the only way to guarantee respect for the fourth amendment.
The Court also observed that the trend in state courts had shifted to adoption of the
exclusionary rule. The Court noted that the maintenance of judicial integrity was
worth the possible price of a criminal's going free: "Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence." Id. at 659.
15. The exclusionary rule has been the subject of considerable criticism. See 8 J.
WGMoRE, EviDENcE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940); Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American
Mistake, 19 DEPAuL L. REv. 80 (1969). Congress has attempted to limit the impact
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which applied the exclusionary rule to
confessions obtained without advising the suspect of his rights, by enacting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(b) (1970):
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into con-
sideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,
including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the de-
fendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before ar-
raignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making
the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew
that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement
could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been ad-
vised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5)
whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession.
Chief Justice Burger has criticized some of the more recent events in the criminal
procedure "revolution." His dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
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The basic policies underlying the exclusionary rule are to deter the
government from using unconstitutional methods of law enforcement'
and to bar the admission of unreliable evidence. 17 In the fourth amend-
ment context the rule rests primarily on the deterrence policy since
tangible evidence is usually seized precisely because of its reliability.
As applied to fifth amendment violations, however, the exclusionary
rule serves both the deterrence and unreliability policies since con-
fessions obtained illegally not only exemplify unlawful police conduct
but also present obvious risks of unreliability.'8
I. ThmD-PARTY STANDING AND THE FOURTH AMENDENT
The issues of fourth amendment third-party standing will be ex-
amined because they involve policy considerations similar to those un-
derlying the question of a defendant's standing to assert the fifth
amendment rights of a coerced witness. As the police can defeat the
policy objectives of fifth amendment protections by torturing witnesses,
they can similarly destroy the protections afforded society in the fourth
amendment by violating the rights of a third party and using the evi-
dence obtained against a defendant.
A person has standing to assert a fourth amendment violation only
if he is "aggrieved" by an unlawful search and seizure.19  He is " ag-
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971), lists major criticisms of the exclusionary
rule.
The excerpt, "the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered"
from People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926), is often quoted in
criticisms of the exclusionary rule.
16. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-33 (1967); Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CM. L. REV. 665 (1970).
18. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964), the Court stated:
It is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use
of involuntary confessions not only because of the probable unreliability of
confessions that are obtained in a manner deemed coercive, but also because
of the "strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are
sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a
conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will," Blackburn
v. Alabama [361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960)], and because of "the deep-rooted
feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law .. .
Spano v. New York [360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959)].
19. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); Goldstein v. United
Washington University Open Scholarship
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grieved" if he has either a reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion20 or a possessory interest in the premises
searched 21 or property seized.22 The first branch of this test currently
allows a person to contest a search if he was legitimately on the searched
premises, so long as the search was directed at him.28  The second
branch of the test normally requires that the defendant either have a
right to occupy the premises, such as would derive from ownership
of a home or lease of an apartment,24 or maintain a present interest in
the property seized.25 The problem of fourth amendment third-party
States, 316 U.S. 114, 120 (1942).
Jones centered on a discussion of the proper interpretation of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(e). The question therefore arises whether the standing require-
ment set forth in Jones derives from the federal rule or from the Constitution. The
answer appears to be that the standard given in Jones is a constitutional standard.
In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963), in which the Court declared that the
states were not precluded from developing their own rules for searches and seizures
to meet "the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforce-
ment," the Court, relying on Jones, added the following qualification:
provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of un-
reasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant command that evidence
so seized is inadmissible against one who has standing to complain.
Also, in Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the court stated:
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution is aimed at the protection of the
privacy of citizens. . . . Therefore, to be aggrieved by a search in violation
of this Amendment a person must be able to show that his privacy was in-
vaded by the search. Prior to Jones, most of the courts applied strict doc-
trines of common law property rights and required for standing a showing of
some very significant possessory interest in the premises. Jones, however,
supplanted this line of authority and held that if the defendant could show
that he was legally upon the premises and the fruits of the search were pro-
posed to be used against him, his privacy had been invaded to the degree
necessary to give him standing to object to the search.
Id. at 878-79. See also United States ex rel. Coffey v. Fay, 344 F.2d 625 (2d Cir.
1965).
20. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Prior to Jones a person had to
have a possessory interest in the premises for standing. For an excellent discussion of
fourth amendment standing before the Jones decision, see Edwards, Standing to Sup-
press Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. RPv. 471 (1952).
21. Under this rationale, someone lawfully staying in a hotel room has the
necessary interest for standing. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).
22. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1960).
23. Id. at 267. Thus, a person wrongfully on the premises, such as a trespasser,
would not have standing under this rationale. Id.
24. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610 (1961).
25. For a time this requirement placed defendants in a harsh dilemma when the
offense alleged was a possessory one, such as possession of narcotics or stolen goods.
The court in Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932), stated:
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standing arises when the defendant who seeks to assert the fourth
amendment violation is not the direct victim of the unreasonable search
and seizure. The majority of lower federal courts have refused to grant
third-party standing in such circumstances.26 The Supreme Court's
most definitive pronouncement denying third-party standing was in
Alderman v. United States,27 in which the defendants claimed that evi-
dence produced by electronic surveillance was unconstitutional "re-
gardless of whose Fourth Amendment rights the surveillance violated." 28
The majority held:
Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession, of
contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a possessor,
and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they
come as victims, they must take on that role, with enough detail to cast them
without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but
they were obligated to choose one horn of the dilemma.
The Supreme Court in Jones provided an escape for the defendant by conferring
automatic standing in possessory offenses without a need for an initial showing of an
interest in the contraband. Because of the Court's holding in Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the rule as to automatic standing for possessory offenses
may not be clear. See Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure,
1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488, 501. Jones was construed to confer standing on persons in
possession of a stolen automobile in Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir.
1965), for:
Federal officers [otherwise] could search cars at will and, of all defendants
prosecuted for automobile theft, only those who actually owned the automo-
biles could raise Fourth Amendment objections successfully.. . . The sole
prerequisite to a defendant's raising the Fourth Amendment issue is that he
claim a proprietary or possessory interest in the searched or seized property.
Id. at 294.
The dissent on petition for rehearing, however, maintained that a thief in possession
of an automobile had no greater right to the application of the exclusionary rule than
a trespasser on real property, stating: "The end result is that Simpson is permitted to
use the very property which he stole as a cloak of immunity." Id. at 300 (Pickett,
J., dissenting).
26. Glisson v. United States, 406 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Graham, 391 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1968); Granza v. United States, 377 F.2d 746 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 939 (1967); United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 154 (5th
Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 62 (1967); United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d
206 (2d Cir. 1966); D'Argento v. United States, 353 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966). Nor can the victim of the search claim the protection
of the fourth amendment for his co-conspirators. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969); Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795 (7th Cir. 1920). A fortiori, in-
criminatory evidence seized from one person by a violation of the fourth amendment
may be used against another person where the latter and the victim of the unreasonable
search are neither co-conspirators nor co-defendants. Lewis v. United States, 92 F.2d
952 (10th Cir. 1937); Newfield v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 729 (1937).
27. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
28. Id. at 171.
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The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth
Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose
rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved
solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. Coconspirators and
codefendants have been accorded no special standing.29
Although Justice Fortas' dissent in Alderman acknowledged that sev-
eral commentators had urged an exception to the third-party standing
rule in order to reinforce the deterrence goal of the exclusionary rule,3"
the majority held that the additional benefits of extending the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule did not "justify further encroachments
on the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which
exposes the truth.' 3'
The California Supreme Court had granted fourth amendment third-
party standing prior to Alderman, 2 basing its decision on the deter-
29. Id. at 171-72. The Court noted, however, that Congress or state legislatures
could extend the exclusionary rule to provide that illegally seized evidence be inad-
missible against anyone for any purposes. Id. at 175. It also reaffirmed the possi-
bility of allowing third-party standing when required by the presence of special cir-
cumstances, as in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 394 U.S. at 174. See note 11 supra.
30. But if the exclusionary rule follows from the Fourth Amendment itself,
there is no basis for confining its invocation to persons whose right of pri-
vacy has been violated by an illegal search. The Fourth Amendment, un-
like the Fifth, is couched in terms of a guarantee that the Government will
not engage in unreasonable searches and seizures.
394 U.S. at 205 (Fortas, J., dissenting). See generally Grove, Suppression of Illegally
Obtained Evidence: The Standing Requirement on Its Last Leg, 18 CATHOLIC U.L.
REv. 150 (1968); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE
LJ. 319; Note, Standing and the Fourth Amendment, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 691 (1969);
Note, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. Rv.
1136 (1967); Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 1965 WASH.
U.L.Q. 488.
31. 394 U.S. at 174-75. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
argued that granting third-party standing would create great administrative difficulties,
yet produce only a marginal increase in fourth amendment protection. Id. at 188 n.1.
32. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). California had
earlier adopted the exclusionary rule as a sanction for violations of the fourth amend-
ment because
other remedies have failed to secure compliance with the constitutional pro-
vision on the part of police officers with the attendant result that the courts
under the old rule had been constantly required to participate in, and in ef-
fect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers.
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12 (1955).
The Martin court relied in part on McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948),
in which the Supreme Court held that a pretrial motion to suppress by a defendant
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rence policy which had supported earlier United States Supreme Court
cases."3 The California court reasoned that if the police could obtain
evidence in violation of the rights of third parties and use this evi-
dence against defendants, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
would be nullified 4 since the police could trade off the possible con-
viction of persons whose rights they violated for the conviction of others
by the use of illegally obtained evidence. In addition to the California
Supreme Court several other courts have granted fourth amendment
third-party standing, 5 but most federal and state courts have refused
to grant it.36
whose rights had been violated had been erroneously denied by the trial court, and
then reversed the conviction of both defendants:
Even though we assume, without deciding, that Washington, who was a guest
of McDonald, had no right of privacy that was broken when the officers
searched McDonald's room without a warrant, we think that the denial of
McDonald's motion was error that was prejudicial to Washington as well. In
this case ... the unlawfully seized materials were the basis of evidence
used against the codefendant.
Id. at 456. The California court reasoned:
There is no basis for concluding, however, that a defendant whose rights
have not been violated should have standing to challenge a pre-trial ruling
against his codefendants, if he has no standing to challenge the legality of
the original seizure. In either situation his right to object to the use of the
evidence must rest, not on a violation of his own constitutional rights, but
on the ground that the government must not be allowed to profit by its own
wrong and thus encourage the lawless enforcement of the law.
45 Cal. 2d at 761, 290 P.2d at 857.
33. See notes 9 & 15 supra and accompanying text.
34. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). The present status of
the Martin decision is uncertain. In Kaplan v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 785,
93 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1971), the court held that the enactment of the 1965 California
Evidence Code had the effect of abolishing all judicially created and non-constitu-
tionally required exclusionary rules, such as that of Martin.
35. See, e.g., Rosencranz v. United States, 334 F.2d 738 (1st Cir. 1964); United
States v. Thompson, 113 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1940); People v. McDonnell, 18 N.Y.2d
509, 223 N.E.2d 785 (1966).
36. See, e.g., Lovette v. United States, 230 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1956); United States
v. White, 228 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1956); Baskerville v. United States, 227 F.2d 454
(10th Cir. 1955); Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955); Steeber v.
United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952); Church v. State, 151 Fla. 24, 9 So. 2d
164 (1942); State v. Dunn, 44 Idaho 636, 258 P. 553 (1927); People v. Tabet, 402
Ill. 93, 83 N.E.2d 329 (1949); Piedmont v. State, 198 Ind. 511, 154 N.E. 282 (1926);
Vogler v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 511, 75 S.W.2d 11 (1934); Rizzo v. State, 201
Md. 206, 93 A.2d 280 (1952); People v. Anscomb, 234 Mich. 203, 208 N.W. 45 (1926);
Brown v. State, 192 Miss. 314, 5 So. 2d 426 (1942); State v. Egan, 272 S.W.2d 719
(Mo. App. 1954); Stephens v. State, 285 P.2d 467 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955); State v.
Hilton, 119 Ore. 441, 249 P. 1103 (1926); Allen v. State, 161 Tenn. 71, 29 S.W.2d
247 (1929).
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IV. THRD-PARTY STANDING AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. The Majority Position
The fifth amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.''s' The Supreme
Court has long held that the privilege against self-incrimination is
personal to the witness himself and cannot be asserted by another per-
son.28 Thus a defendant cannot prevent a witness from incriminating
himself while testifying at the defendant's trial.Y9 Even if a witness is en-
In 1972 the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure adopted a middle ground
between a proposal to preserve the "standing" requirement and an alternative proposal
to eliminate it totally. The Code provides:
A motion to suppress may be made by any defendant against whom things
seized are to be offered in evidence at a criminal trial, if such things were
obtained by a search or seizure from:
(a) the defendant; or
(b) a spouse, parent . .. or any member of his household; or
(c) any person with whom the defendant resides or sojourns; or
(d) a co-defendant, co-conspirator, or any person chargeable with the
same crime with which the defendant is charged; or
(e) any person with whom the defendant conducts a business; or
(f) any other person if, from the circumstances, it appears that the
search or seizure was intended to avoid the application of this Part H
to any of the persons described in clauses (a) to (e) inclusive.
MODEL CODE OF Pan-A._IGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS290.1(5) (Official Draft No. 1,
1972).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 3.
38. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90 (1906).
The Court in Hale was particularly forceful in asserting that:
The right of a person under the 5th Amendment to refuse to incriminate him-
self is purely a personal privilege of the witness. It was never intended to
permit him to plead the fact that some third person might be incriminated by
his testimony, even though he were the agent of such person.
201 U.S. at 69-70. The bases of the two Henkel holdings were reaffirmed in Rogers
V. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). At least one lower federal court held that
fifth amendment rights were personal before the Supreme Court reached the samb
conclusion. Morgan v. Halberstadt, 60 F. 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 154 U.S. 511
(1894).
Typically, the rule that the privilege against self-incrimination is personal is stated
briefly and without argument. See, e.g., Bowman v. United States, 350 F.2d 913, 916
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966); Poole v. United States, 329 F.2d
720, 721 (9th Cir. 1964); Hudson v. United States, 197 F.2d 845, 846 (5th Cir. 1952).
39. 8 J. WicioR , EvIDENCE § 2270 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis
original):
The privilege [against self-incrimination] of course may be claimed by the
witness, whether or not he is a party to the controversy. Where the witness
is not a party, however, a party may not make the claim for the witness ....
See McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90 (1906); Sachs v. Canal Zone, 176 F.2d 292
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949); People v. Mann, 148 Cal. App. 2d 851,
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couraged to testify by an improper grant of immunity from prosecution,
the defendant cannot exclude the witness' testimony.40  The rationale
of the fifth amendment cases applies to the coerced witness situation,
for as the police beating of the witness in Portelli gave the police infor-
mation needed to convict the defendant, violation of the witness' fifth
amendment rights allows the prosecution the opportunity to elicit addi-
tional trial testimony without fear of having the testimony excluded by
the defendant.
B. Post-Portelli
The Portelli rationale has provided authority for some later cases."
In Long v. United States 2 the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that third parties could not exclude the testimony
of witnesses whose McNabb-Mallor4 s rights had been violated. Just
as Portelli allows the police to avoid the deterrence policies of the
coerced confession rule, Long permits the police partially to avoid the
effects of the McNabb-Mallory rule. For, so long as the police are
willing to risk losing the possible conviction of the incarcerated party,
they may willfully violate the McNabb-Mallory rule in hopes that the
incarcerated party will give information which incriminates a party
853, 307 P.2d 684, 685 (1957); Barr v. People, 30 Colo. 522, 71 P. 392 (1903);
Bolen v. People, 184 Ill. 338, 56 N.E. 408 (1900); Butz v. State, 221 Md. 68, 156
A.2d 423 (1959); State v. Hamilton, 304 Mo. 19, 263 S.W. 127 (1924); State v.
Britton, 27 Wash. 2d 336, 178 P.2d 341 (1947).
40. United States ex rel. Berberian v. Cliff, 300 F. Supp. 8, 15 n.4 (E.D. Pa.
1969). See also People v. Carpenter, 32 App. Div. 2d 827, 828, 302 N.Y.S.2d 452,
455 (1969).
41. See Long v. United States, 360 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States ex rel.
Berberian v. Cliff, 300 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Pa. 1969); People v. Carpenter, 32 App. Div.
2d 827, 302 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1969). The Portelli rationale predictably was used in the
trial of Portelli's co-defendant in United States ex rel. Rosenberg v. Mancusi, 445 F.2d
613 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 956 (1972).
42. 360 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
43. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943). Taken together these two cases hold that a confession ob-
tained by federal officers could be excluded from use in a federal prosecution if it was
obtained during a period of "unnecessary delay" in bringing the defendant before a
magistrate. This rule, however, was grounded on the Supreme Court's supervisory power
over the federal courts and, therefore, was not binding on the states as a constitutional
rule. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 600-01 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958). The rule was purportedly changed by Congress in 18
U.S.C. § 3501 (1970). Two recent cases have failed to reach the issue of the constitu-
tionality of the new law. United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757, 760 (8th Cir. 1972);
Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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in whose conviction the police are more interested.
Two cases denying third-party standing to challenge violations of
fifth amendment rights deserve special mention, the first because it signals
a reluctance to grant fifth amendment third-party standing by a court
which had previously granted third-party standing in fourth amend-
ment cases, the second because it highlights dramatically the possibility
of deliberate police practices that proponents of third-party standing
have claimed can be prevented only if such standing is granted.
In the first case, People v. Varnum,44 the police questioned two
prisoners, without informing them of their Miranda rights, about the
hiding place of a gun. Although the court reaffirmed that in Califor-
nia a defendant has standing to object to a search and seizure conducted
in violation of the fourth amendment even when his own rights have not
been infringed,45 the court nevertheless saw no need to accord the
same right to a defendant when a Miranda fifth amendment violation
was involved. The court held:
Noncoercive questioning is not in itself unlawful, however, and the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights protected by . . . Miranda are violated
only when evidence obtained without the required warnings and waiver
is introduced against the person whose questioning produced the evidence.
The basis for the warnings required by Miranda is the privilege against
self-incrimination . . . and that privilege is not violated when the in-
formation elicited from an unwarned suspect is not used against him ....
Unlike unreasonable searches and seizures, which always violate the
Constitution, there is nothing unlawful in questioning an unwarned sus-
pect so long as the police refrain from physically and psychologically
coercive tactics condemned by due process and do not use against the
suspect any evidence obtained. Accordingly, in the absence of such coer-
cive tactics, there is no basis for excluding physical or other non-hear-
say evidence acquired as a result of questioning a suspect in disregard
of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when such evidence is offered
at the trial of another person.46
Since the Varnum court was concerned with noncoercive questioning,
the court framed its decision on facts far removed from those of Portelli,
where the witness was physically abused by the police rather than merely
44. 66 Cal. 2d 808, 427 P.2d 772, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 529 (1968).
45. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
46. 66 Cal. 2d at 808, 427 P.2d at 775-76, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 111-12 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
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deprived of his Miranda rights.17  Violations of the Miranda rule, as
in Varnum, are not shocking in themselves but are objectionable only
in the context of the criminal prosecution of the defendant. Physical
coercion by the police, however, as in Portelli, is both shocking in
itself"' as well as objectionable in the context of the criminal prosecu-
tion of the defendant. Thus, although the deterrence policy underlies
both the Miranda rule and the coerced confession rule, enforcement of
the policy is more significant in relation to coerced confessions since
such enforcement would theoretically prevent police conduct far more
harmful in its effects on the coerced witness than the effects of a Miranda
violation. Furthermore, physical abuse of a witness is more likely to
produce an unreliable confession because the witness may well yield to
police persecution in order to end the coercion, whereas there is no such
immediate pressure on the witness to produce a confession when he is
merely denied his Miranda warnings.
The second case, Dimmick v. State,49 is notable for the conscious
police avoidance of the deterrence considerations underlying Miranda.
Dimmick and his co-defendant were informed of their Miranda rights
and the co-defendant asked for a lawyer. Nevertheless, the police con-
tinued to question the co-defendant and elicited a confession which im-
plicated both him and Dimmick. The police testified at the trial that:
The decision was made to go ahead and interview [the co-defendant]
after he had requested an attorney full-well knowing that then this con-
fession could not be used against him but merely for the value of the
confession against Mr. Dimmick. 5
Despite this blatant violation of the policy objectives of Miranda the
majority of the court refused to allow Dimmick standing to allege this
infringement of his co-defendant's rights, holding that the privilege
against self-incrimination is personal in nature.51
47. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
48. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), the Court described a
forced pumping of defendant's stomach made at the instigation of the police as "conduct
that shocks the conscience."
49. 473 P.2d 616 (Alas. 1970).
50, Id. at 619.
51. Id.:
The privilege pertains solely to the person who makes a statement under
impermissible conditions where the statement is to be used to convict him, and
not some other person. The right is personal in nature-it pertains only
to the person from whom a statement is obtained. It cannot reasonably be
construed as requiring the exclusion of evidence against one not making any
statement in order to protect the rights of the person from whom a statement
877
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The Dimmick majority, however, like the Varnum majority, indicated
that its decision might have been different had the fifth amendment
violation involved physical coercion, similar to the beatings in Portelli:
Whether the use of coerced statements from [the witness] to convict
appellant would . . . violate due process, may involve considerations
different from those involved in the privilege against self-incrimination.
Statements which are the product of coercion may be unreliable and un-
trustworthy, and thus should be excluded as evidence against one not
coerced into making them. But more important, coerced statements
are condemned because . . . human values may be as much involved
and in need of protection when an involuntary statement is used to con-
vict one not coerced into making it as well as when used against the
one from whom the statement was obtained. 2
Thus Dimmick does not eliminate the application in Portelli coerced-
witness situations of the fifth amendment policies of preventing the use
of unreliable and untrustworthy evidence and of deterring illegal law
enforcement practices.
V. JoINT TRIALS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: EVADING
THE STANDING QUESTION
A defendant may in some instances exclude the testimony of a coerced
witness when the witness is a co-defendant. In Anderson v. United
States53 six defendants made out-of-court confessions which implicated
all twenty defendants. The confessors repudiated their confessions at
trial. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions of the confessing de-
fendants because their confessions had been improperly admitted 4 and
also reversed the convictions of the non-confessing defendants because
the jury instructions had not restricted the use of the confessions to a
determination of only the confessors' guilt.Y
In Bruton v. United States5" the Court relied on the sixth amend-
ment to protect a defendant implicated by a co-defendant's extrajudicial
was obtained in violation of the Miranda rule.
Other courts have held that police failure to give Miranda warnings to an accom-
plice does not permit a defendant to exclude the accomplice's statements from trial.
Byrd v. Comstock, 430 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971);
United States v. Schennault, 429 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1970); Bryson v. United States,
419 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. Willis, 260 La. 439, 256 So. 2d 436 (1972).
52. 473 P.2d at 619-20 (footnotes omitted).
53. 318 U.S. 350 (1942).
54. Id. at 351-55.
55. Id. at 356-57.
56. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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confession. The confessor in Bruton did not testify at trial but his
out-of-court statement was admitted into evidence against a co-defendant.
Although the trial judge properly limited the jury's use of the con-
fession to determining only the declarant's guilt, the Court held that
the jury instructions were not a valid substitute for the defendant's sixth
amendment right of confrontation. 57  Thus the non-confessing defend-
ant's right to have the confession excluded was not dependent on the ad-
missibility of the confession, but rather on his right to cross-examine the
declarant at trial.58
While Bruton clearly establishes a defendant's right to exclude refer-
ences to himself in a non-testifying co-defendant's out-of-court confes-
sion, conceptual difficulties may arise in cases in which the confessing
defendant takes the stand. In California v. Green"9 the Court read
Bruton as eliminating any confrontation problem if the declarant takes
the stand.6 0 In Anderson, a pre-Bruton case, the non-confessing defend-
ants had the opportunity at trial to cross-examine the confessing co-de-
fendants whose confessions had been illegally obtained. The Court
57. Id. at 137, overruling Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
58. California courts interpreted Bruton as requiring that the right of confronta-
tion apply when the confession was initially made. See In re Hill, 71 Cal. 2d 997,
458 P.2d 449, 80 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1969). Under this interpretation it would be unlikely
that any confession implicating a co-defendant could ever be admitted at trial. The
California court's reading of Bruton was rejected in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970).
The Supreme Court subsequently clarified Bruton by holding that the right of con-
frontation is satisfied if the confessor takes the stand, even if he repudiates or refuses
to substantiate his out-of-court confession. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
If the declarant testifies at a pretrial judicial proceeding, there would be no confron-
tation objection if the declarant were actually unavailable for testimony at the subse-
quent trial, provided that the non-confessing defendant had an opportunity for cross-
examination at the pretrial proceeding. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-66
(1970), citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1968), Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 407 (1965), and Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). In such
circumstances, a transcript of the declarant's testimony at the pretrial proceeding
would be admissible at trial because it would satisfy the "'indicia of reliability which
have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before
the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant,' Dutton v. Evans [400 U.S.
74, 89 (1970)]," and because "'the trier of fact [would be afforded] a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,' California v. Green [399 U.S. 149, 161
(1970)]." Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972).
59. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
60. Id. at 163 (footnote omitted):
The Court [in Bruton] again emphasized that the error arose because the de-
clarant "does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination," . ..
suggesting that no confrontation problem would have existed if Bruton had
been able to cross-examine his co-defendant.
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nonetheless found a due process violation in the judge's failure to give
limiting jury instructions. While it is clear that Bruton and Green re-
move any confrontation objections in an Anderson situation, does An-
derson continue to require, on due process grounds, limiting jury instruc-
tions even when, as in Anderson, the opportunity to cross-examine
exists? It may be argued that pre-Bruton cases, such as Anderson,
which were decided on the basis of whether proper jury instructions were
given, would after Bruton be resolved on sixth amendment right-to-con-
frontation grounds; it cannot be said with certainty, however, that satisfy-
ing the confrontation requirements of Bruton will necessarily satisfy
Anderson.
1VI. DENIAL OF FAIR TRiAL
One argument used by Portelli's counsel to attempt to overcome the
coerced-witness standing obstacle was that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment guaranteed the defendant a personal right
to a trial in which due process and fundamental fairness were rigidly
maintained."1 The argument proceeds that a defendant cannot get
a fair trial when a coerced witness is involved, not only because the
witness' rights were violated, but because the defendant's own right
to a trial with a reliable fact-finding procedure is infringed. This ap-
proach was urged, although not in its fullest form, in Justice Rutledge's
dissent in Malinski v. New York.6 2  In Malinski one defendant was
coerced into giving a confession which implicated a co-defendant. The
trial court allowed the confession to be introduced into evidence using
a masking device purportedly designed to prevent the jury from knowing
that the confession implicated both defendants.6 3 On appeal Justice
Rutledge, pointing out that the device was so obvious as to actually
identify the second defendant, argued:
61. Brief for Appellant at 24-35, United States ex reL Portelli v. LaVallee, 469
F.2d 1236 (2d Cir. 1972).
62. 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
63. Id. at 430-31. The device employed was to substitute letters for the names of
the implicated parties, to instruct the jury that the confession was to be used against
defendant Malinski alone, and to submit the case against co-defendant Rudish separately
from the one against Malinski. Justice Rutledge argued that this procedure aimed at the
impossible, and that in a eapital case like this one the judgment against Rudish should
be reversed. Id.
The plurality opinion noted that Anderson involved review of a federal district
court proceeding, over which the Supreme Court had more control than it had over
state criminal trials. Id. at 411.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/5
Vol. 1973:865] POLICE COERCION OF WITNESSES
Due process does not permit one to be convicted upon his own coerced
confession. It should not allow him to be convicted upon a confession
wrung from another by coercion. A conviction supported only by such
a confession could be but a variation of trial by ordeal.6 4
Rutledge's due process argument has not been expressly adopted by
other courts as a valid ground for challenging a violation of a coerced
witness' rights, although subsequent decisions6 and at least one dissent66
have relied on the underlying premise of Rutledge's opinion. In Stovall
v. Denno17 the Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility of a due
process challenge based on unfair police procedures. Stovall, unaccom-
panied by counsel, had been identified by the victim in a lineup in the
victim's hospital room. Stovall was the only Black in the lineup and was
handcuffed to another lineup member. Despite the absence of counsel
at the lineup, the Court declined to apply Gilbert v. Californias and
United States v. Wade 9 because the lineup had been conducted prior to
the dates of those decisions. 70 The Court held, however, that "it remains
open to all persons to allege and prove, as Stovall attempts to do in this
case, that the confrontation resulted in such unfairness that it infringed
his rights to due process of law."' 71 Although the Court in Stovall re-
64. Id. at 430-31 (Rutledge, J., dissenting), citing Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411
(1942).
65. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
66. Bradford v. Michigan, 394 U.S. 1022 (1969), denying cert. to 10 Mich. App.
696, 160 N.W.2d 373 (1968). Chief Justice Warren, dissenting with Justices Douglas
and Marshall from denial of certiorari, spoke of the general untrustworthiness of co-
erced confessions, and stated that it should be irrelevant that the coercion was exer-
cised against a witness rather than the accused. Relying on the Rutledge dissent in
Malinski, the Chief Justice argued that admission of a witness' trial testimony was a
violation of due process since it was "cut from the same fabric that produced his
original statement." 394 U.S. at 1023-24.
67. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See generally 58 GEo. LI. 621 (1970).
68. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
69. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
70. 388 U.S. at 302. Stovall held Gilbert and Wade to apply prospectively. Id.
at 296-301.
71. Id. at 299. The Court held that when a lineup containing the suspect of an
alleged crime is "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken iden-
tification," the identification must be suppressed because it denied the accused due
process of law. Id. at 301-02. See, e.g., Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199, 202 (4th
Cir. 1966) (footnotes omitted):
In their understandable zeal to secure an identification, the police simply de-
stroyed the possibility of an objective, impartial judgment by the prosecutrix
as to whether Palmer's voice was in fact that of the man who had attacked
her. Such a procedure fails to meet "those canons of decency and fairness"
established as part of the fundamental law of the land. A state may not
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jected the unfairness challenge on the facts of that case,72 it left the
door open for a remedy based not on a specific constitutional provi-
sion such as the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to con-
frontation or counsel, but rather on the general fairness of the police pro-
cedures as reflected by the totality of circumstances surrounding the
challenged police practice. 7
VII. THE SIGNiFIcANcE OF IN-COURT REPETITION OF THE
COERCED TESTIMONY
The Portelli decision rested in part on the witness' repetition of his
statement in court eight months after his coerced confession. When a
defendant makes two confessions, the first coerced, the court must de-
termine if the second confession is so influenced by the first that it
too is involuntary and must be suppressed.7 4  Since the prosecution
will normally want to put the accusing witness on the stand to substanti-
ate its case against the defendant, the coerced witness situation will fre-
quently involve an in-court repetition of the initial coerced testimony.
The question of the continuation of the original involuntariness will
,thus be present.
rely in a criminal prosecution upon evidence secured by pumping a man's
stomach, by breaking into his home, or by employing subtle psychological
methods on him; nor may it rely on an identification secured by a process
in which the search for truth is made secondary to the quest for a conviction.
See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
The fact that the identification might be conducive to mistake means, of course, that
it may be unreliable, making unnecessary a finding of actual unreliability.
72. The Court noted that in this case an immediate confrontation at the hospital
had been imperative. Only the victim could have exonerated the accused, the hospital
was not far from the jail, and no one knew how much longer the victim would live.
388 U.S. at 302.
73. Cf. id.: "However, a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of
a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it ..
74. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 603 (1944):
The admissibility of the later confession depends upon the same test-is it
voluntary. Of course the fact that the earlier statement was obtained from
the prisoner by coercion is to be considered in appraising the character of
the later confession .... If the relation between the earlier and later con-
fession is not so close that one must say the facts of one control the char-
acter of the other, the inference is one for the triers of fact and their con-
clusion, in such an uncertain situation, that the confession should be admitted
as voluntary, cannot be a denial of due process.
In Lyons the Court upheld the admissibility of a second confession made twelve hours
after Lyons had made a confession following a beating by the police.
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The Supreme Court has recognized that a second confession is al-
most always a partial result of the first, but has held that this considera-
tion is not controlling.75 The final determination of whether the sec-
ond confession is voluntary depends on an examination of the totality
of the circumstances, just as when the voluntariness of any confession
is in question.7" Thus, an in-court confession may be ruled inadmissible
when it somehow was induced by the prosecution's erroneous introduc-
tion of a previous inadmissible confession. 77  To sustain the validity of
a challenged second confession, the state typically must show that the
second confession followed a break in the causative chain extending
from the first confession.7" Although the time between the two confes-
75. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947):
Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confes-
sing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the
psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never
get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a
later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first. But this
Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession under cir-
cumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from
making a usable one after those conditions have been removed.
76. In Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), the Supreme Court, in examining the
admissibility of confessions in the federal courts, employed a common law evidentiary
rule barring confessions obtained by threats and promises. Later, in Brain v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court used a "voluntariness" test somewhat derived
from the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Beginning with Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), the Court began barring the use in state courts of
confessions which did not pass a test of voluntariness, dependent upon the "totality of
the circumstances." Since this necessitated a case-by-case examination of all factors
present in a challenged confession, the test was difficult to administer. As the test
evolved, it aimed at excluding from trial any confession that (1) was of doubtful re-
liability because of the method used to obtain it, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940); (2) was obtained by an offensive police practice, Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534 (1961); or (3) was obtained in a manner that significantly overrode the de-
fendant's free choice, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The decision in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), set out a per se exclusionary rule under which a con-
fession must be excluded at trial unless the defendant had first been advised "that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." Id. at 444. Miranda, however, does not totally negate the importance of
the prior voluntariness cases. Since Miranda does not apply to volunteered statements,
id. at 478, "inquiry into Miranda issues is not coextensive with an investigation of
voluntariness generally." United States v. Bernett, No. 71-1465, at 13 (D.C. Cir.,
Jan. 10, 1974). For a discussion of the relationship between Miranda and voluntari-
ness, and of voluntariness generally, see id. at 10-37.
77. See, e.g., People v. Spencer, 66 Cal. 2d 158, 424 P.2d 715, 57 Cal. Rptr. 163
(1967); People v. Polk, 63 Cal. 2d 443, 406 P.2d 641, 47 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965).
78. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968); Darwin v. Connec-
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sions is a factor,79 an interval of several days will not be sufficient to
make the second confession admissible when elements of coercion re-
main. s0
Determination of the admissibility of a second confession often in-
volves the 'fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree' rule, which holds that the illegali-
ty of an initial police practice taints not only the illegally obtained evi-
dence itself, but also evidence later acquired through information discov-
ered by the improper tactic."' The doctrine would appear to help de-
fendants in a Portelli situation, but the prosecution might make use of one
of two exceptions to the poisonous tree rule. The first exception makes
evidence admissible if it comes from an independent source;8 2 the second
ticut, 391 U.S. 346 (1968); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967); Clewis v. Texas,
386 U.S. 707 (1967); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
79. See, e.g., Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (second confession five
days after first not admissible); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (second con-
fession nine days after first not admissible); Reek v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (second
confession one day after first not admissible); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954)
(second confession five hours after first not admissible); United States v. Bayer, 331
U.S. 532 (1947) (second confession six months after first admissible); Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (second confession four days after first not ad-
missible); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) (second confession twelve hours
after first admissible).
Note that in Portelli, Melville's in-court testimony came eight months after the
testimony obtained by torture, an interval supporting, by its length, the voluntary
nature of the in-court testimony.
80. See, e.g., Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (while recovering from
wounds and under influence of drugs, defendant signed second confession); Clewis v.
Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (defendant, who had only fifth-grade education and no
prior experience with the law, was not advised of right to counsel or right to remain
silent, was questioned for prolonged periods, and was allowed inadequate sleep and
food); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (defendant visited by "doctor" who
had considerable knowledge of hypnosis and who obtained confession; this con-
fession not used against defendant, but other confessions obtained that same eve-
ning were used at trial).
81. The phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" was coined in Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), in which the Court held that the Govern-
ment could not use evidence obtained through a subpoena when the information justify-
ing the subpoena had been acquired through an illegal search. The Court stated:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired should not be used before the
court, but that it should not be used at all.
Id. at 392.
82. This first exception to the rule was created in Silverthorne itself:
mhis does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inacces-
sible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may
be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the government's own
wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.
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admits evidence if its connection with the initial illegality is "so atten-
uated as to dissipate the taint."s One means used to broaden these ex-
ceptions' 4 emphasizes the individual witness' ability to formulate his
83. The attenuation exception was formulated in Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939):
Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information
obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter
of good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint.
The attenuation exception was further expounded in Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963). Federal narcotics agents had illegally entered defendant Toy's
home and arrested him. Toy told the agents the identity and location of Johnny Yee;
a search of Yee's home revealed narcotics, which were sought to be introduced at trial
against Toy. The Supreme Court held the narcotics inadmissible:
Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting establish-
ment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."
Id. at 488 (citation omitted). The case was even more involved, however, as Yee in
turn implicated Wong Sun, who was arrested illegally. Several days after being re-
leased on his own recognizance, Wong Sun voluntarily made an oral confession. The
Supreme Court used the attenuation doctrine to rule that Wong Sun's voluntary action in.
confessing after release and a warning of his rights had dissipated the taint of his
initial, illegal arrest. Id. at 491.
84. For listings of how state and lower federal courts have split on the application
of the two exceptions, see State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141, 166 S.E.2d 53 (1969); Com-
ment, Voluntary Incriminating Statements Made Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest-A
Proposed Modification of the Exclusionary Rule, 71 DICKINSON L. REV. 573 (1967);
Comment, Admissibility of Confessions Made Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest: Wong
Sun v. United States Rei'sited, 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 207 (1970). The last article
points out that the Supreme Court's reliance in Wong Sun on two contrasting factors
has caused a split. On the one hand, the Court emphasized the issue of voluntariness
in that Wong Sun had returned freely to make a confession; on the other hand, the
Court noted the element of deterrence when it saw no logical distinction between the
effects of physical and verbal evidence on the policy underlying the exclusionary rule.
Therefore, cases in which the Court emphasizes the deterrence factor typically exclude
all confessions after an illegal arrest, whereas cases in which the Court emphasizes
the voluntariness element usually pass over improper police ponduct and permit ad-
mission of a confession following an illegal search or arrest on the questionable assump-
tion that a defendant can decide to confess apart from the undue pressure generated by
the illegal police activity. ld. at 210-11.
Some lower courts have attempted to widen the independent source exception by ad-
mitting evidence if the prosecution can show that the derivative evidence would have
been discovered even if the unlawful police act had never occurred. See Maguire,
How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55
J. Cirm. L.C. & P.S. 307 (1964); Note, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for
Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1136 (1967). This approach, however, has
been criticized for its opposition to the deterrence purposes of the exclusionary rule.
See, e.g., United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962); Parts Mfg. Corp. v.
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own testimony free from the influence of prior tainted evidence. Al-
though police may have obtained the identity of the witness through
illegal means, his testimony is admitted because "the living witness is an
individual human personality whose attributes of will, perception,
memory and volition interact to determine what testimony he will
give."
85
Thus, even if a court recognized a defendant's third-party standing
to challenge a witness' coerced confession, the court conceivably might
use the aforementioned exceptions to the poisonous tree doctrine to
admit the witness' testimony despite the defendant's contention that the
witness' in-court testimony should be excluded because derived from
illegal police action. The development of exceptions to the poisonous
tree doctrine may, then, allow the police to be relatively confident that
the coerced witness' subsequent testimony will be admitted.
VIII. EXCLUSION VERSUS JURY DETERMINATION
Exclusion of improperly gained evidence is not the only means of dis-
couraging the police from engaging in undesirable tactics against wit-
nesses. Given the proper instructions, the jury might also disregard
unlawful activity in determining guilt or innocence by refusing to con-
sider a witness' testimony which is based on the witness' prior involun-
tary statement. When a trial judge excludes evidence which has been
coerced from a witness for reasons unrelated to reliability, he limits the
information the jury may use to make its factual determinations. How-
Lynch, 129 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1942); People v. Bilderbach, 62 Cal. 2d 757, 401 P.2d
921 (1965).
85. Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 954 (1964). See also Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 166, 474 P.2d
683, 89 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1970).
This approach was employed recently in a case in which the court expressly noted an
analogy to Portelli. In People v. Mendez, 28 N.Y.2d 94, 268 N.E.2d 778 (1971), the
identity of the complainant in an abortion prosecution had been learned by means of
an illegal wiretap on the defendant's phone. Police then followed the defendant to the
complainant's home, and later questioned the complainant without telling her that her
identity had been discovered by the illegal tap. The complainant gave the police in-
formation upon which the affidavit for a search warrant was based. The court held
that evidence found in a search pursuant to this warrant was admissible. The informa-
tion given by the complainant was not induced by her knowledge of the illegal tap, the
court stated, because the witness was an independent voluntary source of information
that became productive "only upon the application of additional, interacting forces...
which were exerted without confrontation of the witness with the fact of the wiretap
or by like exploitation of the illegal act." Id. at 101, 268 N.E.2d at 782.
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ever, if the jury hears the evidence and determines for itself how much
weight to give it, the overall fact-finding process is arguably strength-
ened in that the jury has more data on which to base its conclusion.
Thus, in Portelli the New York Court of Appeals held that the jury could
hear the testimony regarding the police beating and thereby determine
the truthfulness of the witness.86
However, jury determination of the voluntariness of a coerced witness'
testimony has the shortcomings of any case involving jury instructions.
The problem of failure to follow jury instructions was recognized by
the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno,81 in which the Court held that
the trial judge had to make a separate ruling on the voluntariness of
a defendant's confession. The Court later cited Denno for the prop-
osition that
there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or can-
not, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so
vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the
jury system cannot be ignored.88
The ability of the jury to follow instructions also had been discussed
in Krulewitch v. United States: "The naive assumption that prejudi-
cial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all prac-
ticing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."8' 9 More recently,
Bruton v. United States90 noted the inadequacy of jury instructions to
protect a defendant from prejudicial matters.91 Of course, the sixth
amendment guarantee of confrontation gives the defendant the right to
cross-examine the coerced witness and thereby possibly show the jury
the shortcomings of the evidence. But cross-examination is not a cure-
all. As the Supreme Court warned in United States v. Wade, "[E]ven
though cross-examination is a precious safeguard to a fair trial, it can-
not be viewed as an absolute assurance of accuracy and reliability."9"
Moreover, while cross-examination presumably serves to test the reli-
ability of a coerced witness' in-court repetition of an illegally obtained
extrajudicial statement, it does not fulfill the deterrence function of an
exclusionary rule.
86. 15 N.Y.2d at 239, 205 N.E.2d at 858, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 932-33.
87. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
88. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).
89. 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
90. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
91. Id. at 135-36. See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text.
92. 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
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IX. CONCLUSION
Defendants have had little success in excluding the testimony of
coerced witnesses. Although there has been no Supreme Court case
in point, analogy to fourth amendment Supreme Court cases and state
and lower federal court cases indicates a reluctance to exclude testimony
of coerced witnesses. Such reluctance may well serve to defeat the
deterrence objectives of the exclusioiiary rule. Dimmick v. State9" dis-
closed a conscious police decision to violate a witness' rights in order to
secure the conviction of another party. Portelli dramatizes how such a
decision can lead to the unconscionable practices of law enforcement
which the exclusionary rule was designed to prevent.94
93. 473 P.2d 616 (Alas. 1970). See text accompanying note 49 supra.
94. Cf. People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 819, 427 P.2d 772, 780, 59 Cal. Rptr.
108, 116 (concurring opinion):
Now [the police officer] is impliedly told by the majority that, where
there are multiple suspects, he may, without giving the required warnings and
despite the suspect's request for counsel or desire to remain silent, interrogate
one suspect in violation of these rights in the hope of getting admissible
evidence against the other suspects. The majority opinion can be interpreted
as not only condoning but in effect encouraging such violation of funda-
mental constitutional rights.
This concurring opinion also argued that a reading of Miranda would demonstrate that
its rules "were adopted largely to deter improper police activities, just as the unlawful
search and seizure rules were adopted for the same purposes. The same rule should be
applied to both situations." Id. at 816, 427 P.2d at 780, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
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